180ee78b1f
Tracks read progress on comix.to and kagane.to alongside asura and demonic, in both the userscript and the backend. Implements `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-08-03-comix-kagane-support.md`. ## Userscript - `comix` adapter — `/title/<id>-<slug>`; only the id prefix is identity (the slug follows the title). No `og:image`, so the cover is matched by `alt`. - `kagane` adapter — reader URLs are uuids with no chapter number, so it comes out of `og:title`; anchor scanning is structurally impossible, replaced by `latestChapterFromApi` against kagane's same-origin JSON API. - `seriesId` threaded through `latestChapterFromAnchors` so comix can scope its scan to its own series and a recommendation strip cannot win the maximum. - `@match` for both hosts, panel chips, v1.6.0. ## Backend - `latestChapterFrom` cases: comix parses the SSR JSON state blob (`latestChapterUrl`, scoped to the series id); kagane parses API JSON (`chapter_no`). - Poller allowlist extended; `Poller.BrowserFetch` with `fetcherFor(site)` routes kagane to a browser fetcher. Nil means kagane is not polled at all — never a fallback to the TLS fetcher, which would only ever retrieve a challenge page. - `BrowserFetcher`: chromedp against a `headless-shell` sidecar. kagane sits behind a Cloudflare JS challenge that no TLS fingerprint clears, and the request is made inside the page rather than by replaying `cf_clearance`. - `BROWSER_WS_URL` wiring, sidecar in both compose files (no `ports:`, dedicated non-external network), Dockerfile on `golang:1.26-alpine` — chromedp requires go 1.26. - Web UI `--comix` / `--kagane` tokens in both colour branches. ## Notes for review - `series_url` is client-supplied and a headless browser is a strong SSRF primitive, so kagane's host is pinned twice: in `fetchableSeriesURL` and again in `kaganeAPIURL`. - Three chained defects found during verification made the browser path dead under Compose (sidecar flag collision, Chrome's Host-header DNS-rebinding check, the wrong chromedp option). Fixed; the compose comments record the wrong configurations too, so they don't get "simplified" back. - `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` now includes both new origins. Without it every write from comix/kagane silently fails CORS preflight, parks in the retry queue, and drops at the cap. ## Verification 221 backend tests, 32 userscript tests, static `CGO_ENABLED=0` build, both compose configs. Two gaps, both real: 1. The userscript on live pages via Violentmonkey needs a human browser profile — not run. Check: comix series page (title/cover, no chapter), comix chapter page (records the number; an *older* chapter must not regress it), comix SPA navigation without reload, kagane series page (og:image cover), kagane reader (number from `og:title`), both chips opening the right sites. 2. The kagane browser path has not completed end-to-end anywhere. Dial/navigate/fetch is confirmed, but Cloudflare 403'd headless-shell's Chrome on every attempt from the dev sandbox, and comix's poll-through-Docker was blocked by that environment's TLS interception. Both environment-dependent rather than branch defects — the first real deploy is the actual verification. Reviewed-on: #13 Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
189 lines
5.9 KiB
Go
189 lines
5.9 KiB
Go
package session
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import (
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"encoding/base64"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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const (
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CookieName = "mangabm_session"
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// 60 days: long enough that a phone stays logged in between reading spells.
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sessionTTL = 60 * 24 * time.Hour
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// Domain separation, so the session key can never collide with any other
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// use of the secrets it is derived from. Changing this string logs
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// everyone out.
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sessionKeyPurpose = "mangabm-web-session-v1"
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)
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// Key derives the cookie-signing key from both secrets. Sessions are
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// stateless — there is no session table — so rotating either API_TOKEN or
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// WEB_PASSWORD invalidates every outstanding cookie at once. The \x00
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// separator prevents the concatenation ambiguity a bare apiToken+webPassword
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// would have (e.g. "ab"+"c" colliding with "a"+"bc").
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func Key(apiToken, webPassword string) []byte {
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(apiToken + "\x00" + webPassword + sessionKeyPurpose))
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return sum[:]
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}
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// Sign encodes "<expiryMs>.<base64url HMAC(expiryMs)>".
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func Sign(key []byte, expiryMs int64) string {
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payload := strconv.FormatInt(expiryMs, 10)
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return payload + "." + sessionMAC(key, payload)
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}
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func sessionMAC(key []byte, payload string) string {
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
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mac.Write([]byte(payload))
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return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
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}
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// Verify checks shape, then expiry, then the signature — in that order.
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// The signature comparison is constant-time; the checks before it only look at
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// data the holder already supplied, so their timing leaks nothing.
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func Verify(key []byte, value string, nowMs int64) bool {
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payload, sig, ok := strings.Cut(value, ".")
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if !ok {
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return false
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}
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expiry, err := strconv.ParseInt(payload, 10, 64)
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if err != nil || expiry <= nowMs {
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return false
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}
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want := sessionMAC(key, payload)
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return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(sig), []byte(want)) == 1
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}
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// isHTTPS reports whether the browser's connection is encrypted. Behind Traefik
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// the Go server itself speaks plain HTTP, so the forwarded header is the only
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// signal; without this check the Secure cookie would never be set in
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// production, and setting it unconditionally would break http://localhost dev.
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func isHTTPS(r *http.Request) bool {
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return r.TLS != nil || r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "https"
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}
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func SetCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, key []byte) {
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http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
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Name: CookieName,
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Value: Sign(key, time.Now().Add(sessionTTL).UnixMilli()),
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Path: "/",
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MaxAge: int(sessionTTL / time.Second),
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HttpOnly: true,
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Secure: isHTTPS(r),
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SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
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})
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}
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func ClearCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
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Name: CookieName,
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Value: "",
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Path: "/",
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MaxAge: -1,
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HttpOnly: true,
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Secure: isHTTPS(r),
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SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
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})
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}
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const (
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MaxFailures = 10
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Window = 20 * time.Minute
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)
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// ClientIP returns the address the reverse proxy actually observed.
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//
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// Traefik appends the peer address to whatever X-Forwarded-For the client sent,
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// so the leftmost entry is attacker-controlled and the rightmost is not. Go's
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// Header.Get would only read the first header line, which a client can preempt
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// by sending its own; Values covers every line so the true last hop is found.
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// RemoteAddr is useless behind the proxy — it is always the Traefik container —
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// so it serves only as the direct-connection fallback for local development.
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func ClientIP(r *http.Request) string {
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if vals := r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For"); len(vals) > 0 {
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hops := strings.Split(vals[len(vals)-1], ",")
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if ip := strings.TrimSpace(hops[len(hops)-1]); ip != "" {
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return ip
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}
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}
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
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if err != nil {
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return r.RemoteAddr
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}
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return host
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}
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// LoginLimiter throttles password guessing: MaxFailures failures inside a
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// rolling Window blocks further attempts from that IP until the oldest one
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// ages out. There is no permanent ban and no unlock step.
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//
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// Behind carrier-grade NAT this budget is shared with every other subscriber on
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// the same public address, so a stranger can lock the owner out for up to one
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// window. That is accepted: the block self-heals, and ten attempts is generous
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// for a mistyped password.
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//
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// State is in memory and per-process, so a restart clears it. Entries are
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// pruned lazily on access; for a single-user deployment the map cannot grow
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// past the handful of addresses that ever attempt a login.
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type LoginLimiter struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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failures map[string][]time.Time
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}
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func NewLoginLimiter() *LoginLimiter {
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return &LoginLimiter{failures: make(map[string][]time.Time)}
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}
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// retryAfter returns how long ip must wait, or zero when it may try now.
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func (l *LoginLimiter) RetryAfter(ip string, now time.Time) time.Duration {
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l.mu.Lock()
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defer l.mu.Unlock()
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recent := l.pruneLocked(ip, now)
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if len(recent) < MaxFailures {
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return 0
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}
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return recent[0].Add(Window).Sub(now)
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}
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func (l *LoginLimiter) Fail(ip string, now time.Time) {
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l.mu.Lock()
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defer l.mu.Unlock()
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l.failures[ip] = append(l.pruneLocked(ip, now), now)
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}
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func (l *LoginLimiter) Reset(ip string) {
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l.mu.Lock()
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defer l.mu.Unlock()
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delete(l.failures, ip)
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}
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// pruneLocked drops attempts older than the window and returns what is left.
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// The caller must hold l.mu.
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func (l *LoginLimiter) pruneLocked(ip string, now time.Time) []time.Time {
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cutoff := now.Add(-Window)
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// In-place filter: kept reuses the backing array of the slice being
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// ranged over. Safe to alias because append writes at index len(kept),
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// which is always <= the range index i, and element i is read before
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// that write — the write cursor can never overtake the read cursor.
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kept := l.failures[ip][:0]
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for _, at := range l.failures[ip] {
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if at.After(cutoff) {
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kept = append(kept, at)
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}
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}
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if len(kept) == 0 {
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delete(l.failures, ip)
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return nil
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}
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l.failures[ip] = kept
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return kept
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}
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