sulthan
27cf0955de
Closes #24. Child of #18; based on current main (includes Postgres, Reader table, Discord OAuth).
## What
Each Reader's userscript credential is derived from `TOKEN_KEY`, their Discord id and a token epoch (HMAC-SHA256, hex); only its SHA-256 sits in `readers.token_sha256` (new `token_epoch` column, migration 0006). One credential authenticates the script download path and the API bearer header.
- `internal/token`: derivation + hashing; the seed refreshes the owner's epoch-0 hash only before first rotation, so a restart can never resurrect a rotated-away credential
- `httpmw.Auth`/`ResolveReader`: acting Reader resolved from the credential hash, stashed in request context; the retired global `API_TOKEN` resolves to the owner until `API_TOKEN_GRACE_UNTIL` (enforced in code, logged per use) on both the bearer and script-download paths
- Userscript handler renders the bindmounted file with the resolved Reader's credential substituted for `__API_TOKEN__`; a legacy-path request during grace serves the derived credential, so installed devices self-migrate on their next update poll
- Web UI: "Userscripts" panel — session-gated install endpoints render the script directly (credential never in markup, address bar, or a redirect), confirm-gated rotation with an atomic epoch bump + hash rewrite and a reinstall warning
- Both userscripts carry `__API_TOKEN__` placeholders; the committed global-token literal is removed
## Design note
Credentials are derived rather than stored-random because the server must rebuild install URLs after restarts while the DB holds only hashes. HMAC output is high-entropy and unbrute-forceable; the AC's intent (unguessable, DB-leak-proof) is met.
## Deploy (also in DEPLOY.md)
1. Add `TOKEN_KEY` (`openssl rand -hex 32`) — required; changing it later invalidates every credential.
2. Keep `API_TOKEN` + set `API_TOKEN_GRACE_UNTIL` for the 14-day window.
3. After deploy, sign in → Userscripts → reinstall both scripts on every device. This also retires the old global credential for real — its literal survives in git history (present since 0ef5286), so rotation is what kills it.
## Verification
- Full Go suite green against real Postgres per test; userscript JS suite 45/45
- New router-level tests: per-Reader isolation (read/write/delete), grace expiry on bearer + script path, self-migrating legacy path, install serving, rotation (old cred 401/404, new cred works, install renders new credential), app page leaks no credential
- Store tests: hash lookup, token info, atomic rotation with stale-epoch rejection, rotation survives restart
- Live smoke of the built binary: grace acceptance logged, derived auth, substitution, restart resilience, stored hash = SHA-256 of derived credential
Reviewed-on: #32
Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
54 lines
1.4 KiB
Go
54 lines
1.4 KiB
Go
package token
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestTokenDeterministicPerReaderAndEpoch(t *testing.T) {
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key := []byte("deployment-secret")
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a := Token(key, "reader-1", 0)
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b := Token(key, "reader-1", 0)
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if a != b {
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t.Fatal("same (reader, epoch) derived different credentials")
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}
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if a == Token(key, "reader-2", 0) {
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t.Fatal("different readers derived the same credential")
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}
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if a == Token(key, "reader-1", 1) {
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t.Fatal("rotation epoch derived the same credential")
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}
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}
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func TestTokenChangesWithSecret(t *testing.T) {
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a := Token([]byte("key-1"), "reader-1", 0)
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b := Token([]byte("key-2"), "reader-1", 0)
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if a == b {
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t.Fatal("different secrets derived the same credential")
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}
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}
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func TestTokenFormat(t *testing.T) {
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cred := Token([]byte("key"), "reader-1", 0)
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// 32 bytes of HMAC-SHA256, hex-encoded: the length the install URL and
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// the committed placeholder both assume.
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if len(cred) != 64 {
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t.Fatalf("credential length = %d, want 64", len(cred))
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}
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for _, c := range cred {
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if !(c >= '0' && c <= '9' || c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
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t.Fatalf("credential contains non-hex byte %q", c)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestHashIsSha256OfCredential(t *testing.T) {
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cred := Token([]byte("key"), "reader-1", 0)
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got := Hash(cred)
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want := sha256.Sum256([]byte(cred))
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if !bytes.Equal(got[:], want[:]) {
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t.Fatal("Hash is not the SHA-256 of the credential")
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}
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}
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