Files
mangaBookmark/backend/internal/session/session_test.go
sulthan 180ee78b1f Add comix.to and kagane.to support (#13)
Tracks read progress on comix.to and kagane.to alongside asura and demonic, in both the userscript and the backend.

Implements `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-08-03-comix-kagane-support.md`.

## Userscript

- `comix` adapter — `/title/<id>-<slug>`; only the id prefix is identity (the slug follows the title). No `og:image`, so the cover is matched by `alt`.
- `kagane` adapter — reader URLs are uuids with no chapter number, so it comes out of `og:title`; anchor scanning is structurally impossible, replaced by `latestChapterFromApi` against kagane's same-origin JSON API.
- `seriesId` threaded through `latestChapterFromAnchors` so comix can scope its scan to its own series and a recommendation strip cannot win the maximum.
- `@match` for both hosts, panel chips, v1.6.0.

## Backend

- `latestChapterFrom` cases: comix parses the SSR JSON state blob (`latestChapterUrl`, scoped to the series id); kagane parses API JSON (`chapter_no`).
- Poller allowlist extended; `Poller.BrowserFetch` with `fetcherFor(site)` routes kagane to a browser fetcher. Nil means kagane is not polled at all — never a fallback to the TLS fetcher, which would only ever retrieve a challenge page.
- `BrowserFetcher`: chromedp against a `headless-shell` sidecar. kagane sits behind a Cloudflare JS challenge that no TLS fingerprint clears, and the request is made inside the page rather than by replaying `cf_clearance`.
- `BROWSER_WS_URL` wiring, sidecar in both compose files (no `ports:`, dedicated non-external network), Dockerfile on `golang:1.26-alpine` — chromedp requires go 1.26.
- Web UI `--comix` / `--kagane` tokens in both colour branches.

## Notes for review

- `series_url` is client-supplied and a headless browser is a strong SSRF primitive, so kagane's host is pinned twice: in `fetchableSeriesURL` and again in `kaganeAPIURL`.
- Three chained defects found during verification made the browser path dead under Compose (sidecar flag collision, Chrome's Host-header DNS-rebinding check, the wrong chromedp option). Fixed; the compose comments record the wrong configurations too, so they don't get "simplified" back.
- `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` now includes both new origins. Without it every write from comix/kagane silently fails CORS preflight, parks in the retry queue, and drops at the cap.

## Verification

221 backend tests, 32 userscript tests, static `CGO_ENABLED=0` build, both compose configs.

Two gaps, both real:

1. The userscript on live pages via Violentmonkey needs a human browser profile — not run. Check: comix series page (title/cover, no chapter), comix chapter page (records the number; an *older* chapter must not regress it), comix SPA navigation without reload, kagane series page (og:image cover), kagane reader (number from `og:title`), both chips opening the right sites.
2. The kagane browser path has not completed end-to-end anywhere. Dial/navigate/fetch is confirmed, but Cloudflare 403'd headless-shell's Chrome on every attempt from the dev sandbox, and comix's poll-through-Docker was blocked by that environment's TLS interception. Both environment-dependent rather than branch defects — the first real deploy is the actual verification.

Reviewed-on: #13
Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
2026-08-03 19:53:45 +07:00

233 lines
6.0 KiB
Go

package session
import (
"crypto/tls"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestSessionRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
key := Key("token-abc", "pw-abc")
now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
value := Sign(key, now+60_000)
if !Verify(key, value, now) {
t.Fatal("Verify = false for a freshly signed cookie, want true")
}
}
func TestSessionRejects(t *testing.T) {
key := Key("token-abc", "pw-abc")
now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
valid := Sign(key, now+60_000)
payload, sig, _ := strings.Cut(valid, ".")
cases := []struct {
name string
value string
}{
{"empty", ""},
{"no separator", payload + sig},
{"unparseable expiry", "notanumber." + sig},
{"expired", Sign(key, now-1)},
{"tampered signature", payload + "." + flipLastChar(sig)},
{"tampered expiry", "99999999999999." + sig},
{"signed with another key", Sign(Key("other-token", "pw-abc"), now+60_000)},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if Verify(key, tc.value, now) {
t.Fatalf("Verify(%q) = true, want false", tc.value)
}
})
}
}
func flipLastChar(s string) string {
if s == "" {
return "x"
}
last := s[len(s)-1]
if last == 'A' {
return s[:len(s)-1] + "B"
}
return s[:len(s)-1] + "A"
}
func TestSessionKeyDependsOnToken(t *testing.T) {
a := Key("token-a", "pw-abc")
b := Key("token-b", "pw-abc")
if string(a) == string(b) {
t.Fatal("Key collided for different API tokens")
}
}
func TestSessionKeyDependsOnWebPassword(t *testing.T) {
a := Key("token-abc", "pw-a")
b := Key("token-abc", "pw-b")
if string(a) == string(b) {
t.Fatal("Key collided for different web passwords with the same API token")
}
}
func TestSetSessionCookieAttributes(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
tls bool
forwarded string
wantSecure bool
}{
{"plain http dev", false, "", false},
{"direct tls", true, "", true},
{"behind https proxy", false, "https", true},
{"behind http proxy", false, "http", false},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/login", nil)
if tc.tls {
r.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{}
}
if tc.forwarded != "" {
r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", tc.forwarded)
}
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
SetCookie(rr, r, Key("token-abc", "pw-abc"))
cookies := rr.Result().Cookies()
if len(cookies) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("got %d cookies, want 1", len(cookies))
}
c := cookies[0]
if c.Name != CookieName {
t.Fatalf("cookie name = %q, want %q", c.Name, CookieName)
}
if !c.HttpOnly {
t.Fatal("cookie HttpOnly = false, want true")
}
if c.SameSite != http.SameSiteLaxMode {
t.Fatalf("cookie SameSite = %v, want Lax", c.SameSite)
}
if c.Path != "/" {
t.Fatalf("cookie Path = %q, want /", c.Path)
}
if c.Secure != tc.wantSecure {
t.Fatalf("cookie Secure = %v, want %v", c.Secure, tc.wantSecure)
}
if c.MaxAge != int(sessionTTL/time.Second) {
t.Fatalf("cookie MaxAge = %d, want %d", c.MaxAge, int(sessionTTL/time.Second))
}
})
}
}
func TestClearSessionCookie(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/logout", nil)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
ClearCookie(rr, r)
cookies := rr.Result().Cookies()
if len(cookies) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("got %d cookies, want 1", len(cookies))
}
if cookies[0].MaxAge >= 0 {
t.Fatalf("cleared cookie MaxAge = %d, want negative", cookies[0].MaxAge)
}
}
func TestClientIP(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
remoteAddr string
xff []string
want string
}{
{"no header falls back to remote addr", "203.0.113.9:5555", nil, "203.0.113.9"},
{"single proxy hop", "10.0.0.1:5555", []string{"203.0.113.9"}, "203.0.113.9"},
{
// The client sent "1.2.3.4" itself; Traefik appended the address it
// actually saw. Only the rightmost entry is trustworthy.
name: "spoofed left entry is ignored",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5555",
xff: []string{"1.2.3.4, 203.0.113.9"},
want: "203.0.113.9",
},
{
name: "spoofed separate header line is ignored",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5555",
xff: []string{"1.2.3.4", "203.0.113.9"},
want: "203.0.113.9",
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/login", nil)
r.RemoteAddr = tc.remoteAddr
for _, v := range tc.xff {
r.Header.Add("X-Forwarded-For", v)
}
if got := ClientIP(r); got != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("ClientIP() = %q, want %q", got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestLoginLimiterBlocksAfterMaxFailures(t *testing.T) {
l := NewLoginLimiter()
now := time.Now()
for i := 0; i < MaxFailures; i++ {
if wait := l.RetryAfter("1.2.3.4", now); wait != 0 {
t.Fatalf("blocked after %d failures, want block only after %d", i, MaxFailures)
}
l.Fail("1.2.3.4", now)
}
wait := l.RetryAfter("1.2.3.4", now)
if wait <= 0 {
t.Fatalf("retryAfter = %v after %d failures, want > 0", wait, MaxFailures)
}
if wait > Window {
t.Fatalf("retryAfter = %v, want <= %v", wait, Window)
}
}
func TestLoginLimiterWindowExpires(t *testing.T) {
l := NewLoginLimiter()
start := time.Now()
for i := 0; i < MaxFailures; i++ {
l.Fail("1.2.3.4", start)
}
if l.RetryAfter("1.2.3.4", start) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected block immediately after the failures")
}
later := start.Add(Window + time.Second)
if wait := l.RetryAfter("1.2.3.4", later); wait != 0 {
t.Fatalf("retryAfter = %v once the window passed, want 0", wait)
}
}
func TestLoginLimiterResetClearsCounter(t *testing.T) {
l := NewLoginLimiter()
now := time.Now()
for i := 0; i < MaxFailures; i++ {
l.Fail("1.2.3.4", now)
}
l.Reset("1.2.3.4")
if wait := l.RetryAfter("1.2.3.4", now); wait != 0 {
t.Fatalf("retryAfter = %v after reset, want 0", wait)
}
}
func TestLoginLimiterIsPerIP(t *testing.T) {
l := NewLoginLimiter()
now := time.Now()
for i := 0; i < MaxFailures; i++ {
l.Fail("1.2.3.4", now)
}
if wait := l.RetryAfter("5.6.7.8", now); wait != 0 {
t.Fatalf("retryAfter for a different IP = %v, want 0", wait)
}
}