Give the Tailscale ACL step a working policy file #53

Merged
sulthan merged 2 commits from docs/tailscale-acl into main 2026-08-09 16:12:03 +07:00
+96 -8
View File
@@ -309,18 +309,95 @@ refuses to start rather than guess.
**Narrow it to the one device that needs it.** The bind address keeps CDP off
your LAN; it still leaves port 9222 open to every device on the tailnet, and
CDP has no login. Add a rule in the Tailscale admin console's access controls
so only the VPS can reach it — tag the two machines, then:
CDP has no login — a compromised phone is enough to drive this host. A new
tailnet's policy is allow-all, so this is the step that makes "Tailscale
identity is the access control" true rather than aspirational.
Tailscale has no `deny`, so a restriction is expressed by removing the blanket
grant and enumerating what is left. That only works if the browser machine can
be *excluded* from a selector that still covers your own devices — which is
what tagging buys: a tagged device has no user, so `autogroup:member` and
`autogroup:self` stop matching it. Tagging is the mechanism, not decoration.
In the admin console, under **Access controls**, the shipped policy grants
`{"src": ["*"], "dst": ["*"], "ip": ["*"]}`. Replace it:
```jsonc
// tailnet policy file
"acls": [
{ "action": "accept", "src": ["tag:bookmark-api"], "dst": ["tag:bookmark-browser:9222"] },
]
{
"tagOwners": {
// Empty list: implicitly owned by the tailnet Owner/Admins, which is you.
"tag:bookmark-api": [],
"tag:bookmark-browser": [],
},
"grants": [
// The only thing on the tailnet that may drive the browser.
{
"src": ["tag:bookmark-api"],
"dst": ["tag:bookmark-browser"],
"ip": ["tcp:9222"],
},
// Your own devices reach your own devices, and the VPS, in full.
{
"src": ["autogroup:member"],
"dst": ["autogroup:self", "tag:bookmark-api"],
"ip": ["*"],
},
// On the browser machine you get SSH and nothing else. Widen this to `*`
// and the restriction above is void; delete it and you are locked out.
{
"src": ["autogroup:member"],
"dst": ["tag:bookmark-browser"],
"ip": ["tcp:22"],
},
// Uncomment if you route traffic through an exit node — dropping the
// blanket grant takes exit-node access with it.
// {"src": ["autogroup:member"], "dst": ["autogroup:internet"], "ip": ["*"]},
],
// Tagged devices left `autogroup:self`, so Tailscale SSH needs them named.
// Irrelevant if you reach these boxes with ordinary sshd over the tailnet —
// that is the `tcp:22` grant above.
"ssh": [
{
"action": "check",
"src": ["autogroup:member"],
"dst": ["autogroup:self", "tag:bookmark-api", "tag:bookmark-browser"],
"users": ["autogroup:nonroot", "root"],
},
],
// Run on every save, so a later edit that reopens 9222 is rejected outright.
"tests": [
{ "src": "tag:bookmark-api", "accept": ["tag:bookmark-browser:9222"] },
{
"src": "you@example.com",
"accept": ["tag:bookmark-browser:22"],
"deny": ["tag:bookmark-browser:9222"],
},
],
}
```
Without a rule the tailnet default is allow-all, so this step is what makes
"Tailscale identity is the access control" true rather than aspirational.
Then apply the tags — on the VPS and the home machine respectively:
```bash
sudo tailscale up --advertise-tags=tag:bookmark-api
sudo tailscale up --advertise-tags=tag:bookmark-browser
```
Each re-authenticates in a browser and issues a new node key; the tailnet IP is
unchanged, so `BROWSER_WS_URL` and `BROWSER_BIND_ADDR` still hold. Key expiry is
disabled once a device is tagged, which is what you want for a server — an
expired key would otherwise take the poller down every few months.
**Tagging replaces the device's user identity**, so do this only to machines
that exist to run these services. If your "home machine" is also your daily
driver, tag it anyway and reach it through the `:22` rule above, or skip the
tag and accept that any device of yours can reach CDP.
Enforcement is by the destination's packet filter, so the check below is real,
not advisory.
Prove the bind is tight, from the home machine itself:
@@ -334,6 +411,17 @@ The first call is also what wakes Chrome: it is not running until something
connects, and it is reaped again after five idle minutes. A cold first response
takes a few seconds; that is the browser starting, not a fault.
That check proves the *bind*, not the ACL — traffic that starts on the node is
not filtered. Prove the ACL from somewhere else: on your laptop or phone the
same URL must now time out, and from the VPS it must answer.
```bash
# on any other device of yours -> hangs until timeout
curl -s -m 5 http://<home machine tailnet IP>:9222/json/version
# on the VPS -> JSON
curl -s -m 20 http://<home machine tailnet IP>:9222/json/version
```
**On the VPS:**
```bash