feat: password-gated web UI on the same backend #1

Merged
sulthan merged 14 commits from feat/web-ui into main 2026-07-26 03:59:59 +07:00
2 changed files with 186 additions and 0 deletions
Showing only changes of commit 6030a985fa - Show all commits
+92
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,11 @@ import (
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"net"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
@@ -87,3 +89,93 @@ func clearSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
})
}
const (
loginMaxFailures = 10
loginWindow = 20 * time.Minute
)
// clientIP returns the address the reverse proxy actually observed.
//
// Traefik appends the peer address to whatever X-Forwarded-For the client sent,
// so the leftmost entry is attacker-controlled and the rightmost is not. Go's
// Header.Get would only read the first header line, which a client can preempt
// by sending its own; Values covers every line so the true last hop is found.
// RemoteAddr is useless behind the proxy — it is always the Traefik container —
// so it serves only as the direct-connection fallback for local development.
func clientIP(r *http.Request) string {
if vals := r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For"); len(vals) > 0 {
hops := strings.Split(vals[len(vals)-1], ",")
if ip := strings.TrimSpace(hops[len(hops)-1]); ip != "" {
return ip
}
}
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
return r.RemoteAddr
}
return host
}
// loginLimiter throttles password guessing: loginMaxFailures failures inside a
// rolling loginWindow blocks further attempts from that IP until the oldest one
// ages out. There is no permanent ban and no unlock step.
//
// Behind carrier-grade NAT this budget is shared with every other subscriber on
// the same public address, so a stranger can lock the owner out for up to one
// window. That is accepted: the block self-heals, and ten attempts is generous
// for a mistyped password.
//
// State is in memory and per-process, so a restart clears it. Entries are
// pruned lazily on access; for a single-user deployment the map cannot grow
// past the handful of addresses that ever attempt a login.
type loginLimiter struct {
mu sync.Mutex
failures map[string][]time.Time
}
func newLoginLimiter() *loginLimiter {
return &loginLimiter{failures: make(map[string][]time.Time)}
}
// retryAfter returns how long ip must wait, or zero when it may try now.
func (l *loginLimiter) retryAfter(ip string, now time.Time) time.Duration {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
recent := l.pruneLocked(ip, now)
if len(recent) < loginMaxFailures {
return 0
}
return recent[0].Add(loginWindow).Sub(now)
}
func (l *loginLimiter) fail(ip string, now time.Time) {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
l.failures[ip] = append(l.pruneLocked(ip, now), now)
}
func (l *loginLimiter) reset(ip string) {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
delete(l.failures, ip)
}
// pruneLocked drops attempts older than the window and returns what is left.
// The caller must hold l.mu.
func (l *loginLimiter) pruneLocked(ip string, now time.Time) []time.Time {
cutoff := now.Add(-loginWindow)
kept := l.failures[ip][:0]
for _, at := range l.failures[ip] {
if at.After(cutoff) {
kept = append(kept, at)
}
}
if len(kept) == 0 {
delete(l.failures, ip)
return nil
}
l.failures[ip] = kept
return kept
}
+94
View File
@@ -128,3 +128,97 @@ func TestClearSessionCookie(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("cleared cookie MaxAge = %d, want negative", cookies[0].MaxAge)
}
}
func TestClientIP(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
remoteAddr string
xff []string
want string
}{
{"no header falls back to remote addr", "203.0.113.9:5555", nil, "203.0.113.9"},
{"single proxy hop", "10.0.0.1:5555", []string{"203.0.113.9"}, "203.0.113.9"},
{
// The client sent "1.2.3.4" itself; Traefik appended the address it
// actually saw. Only the rightmost entry is trustworthy.
name: "spoofed left entry is ignored",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5555",
xff: []string{"1.2.3.4, 203.0.113.9"},
want: "203.0.113.9",
},
{
name: "spoofed separate header line is ignored",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5555",
xff: []string{"1.2.3.4", "203.0.113.9"},
want: "203.0.113.9",
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/login", nil)
r.RemoteAddr = tc.remoteAddr
for _, v := range tc.xff {
r.Header.Add("X-Forwarded-For", v)
}
if got := clientIP(r); got != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("clientIP() = %q, want %q", got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestLoginLimiterBlocksAfterMaxFailures(t *testing.T) {
l := newLoginLimiter()
now := time.Now()
for i := 0; i < loginMaxFailures; i++ {
if wait := l.retryAfter("1.2.3.4", now); wait != 0 {
t.Fatalf("blocked after %d failures, want block only after %d", i, loginMaxFailures)
}
l.fail("1.2.3.4", now)
}
wait := l.retryAfter("1.2.3.4", now)
if wait <= 0 {
t.Fatalf("retryAfter = %v after %d failures, want > 0", wait, loginMaxFailures)
}
if wait > loginWindow {
t.Fatalf("retryAfter = %v, want <= %v", wait, loginWindow)
}
}
func TestLoginLimiterWindowExpires(t *testing.T) {
l := newLoginLimiter()
start := time.Now()
for i := 0; i < loginMaxFailures; i++ {
l.fail("1.2.3.4", start)
}
if l.retryAfter("1.2.3.4", start) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected block immediately after the failures")
}
later := start.Add(loginWindow + time.Second)
if wait := l.retryAfter("1.2.3.4", later); wait != 0 {
t.Fatalf("retryAfter = %v once the window passed, want 0", wait)
}
}
func TestLoginLimiterResetClearsCounter(t *testing.T) {
l := newLoginLimiter()
now := time.Now()
for i := 0; i < loginMaxFailures; i++ {
l.fail("1.2.3.4", now)
}
l.reset("1.2.3.4")
if wait := l.retryAfter("1.2.3.4", now); wait != 0 {
t.Fatalf("retryAfter = %v after reset, want 0", wait)
}
}
func TestLoginLimiterIsPerIP(t *testing.T) {
l := newLoginLimiter()
now := time.Now()
for i := 0; i < loginMaxFailures; i++ {
l.fail("1.2.3.4", now)
}
if wait := l.retryAfter("5.6.7.8", now); wait != 0 {
t.Fatalf("retryAfter for a different IP = %v, want 0", wait)
}
}