2b96b43fd0e6f90ff6a3f5a44c0161ae751e64e0
8 Commits
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ba679223b2 |
Sightings: a Reader report defers a Poll of a solitary Series (#103) (#108)
Closes #103. A userscript PUT already carries the Latest Chapter the Reader's own browser read off the Series page. It may now stand in for a Poll, under one restriction and one ceiling: - **Solitary Series only** — a Series two Readers share is Polled on schedule however recently it was sighted, so one Reader's mistake can never reach another's list. - **One rest of standing**, and a **six-rest ceiling** (`sightingCeilingRests`, counted in the Site's own Rest): however many Sightings arrive, an unpolled Series is Polled. Both live in the due query's HAVING clause (`Store.DueForLatestCheck`) — the same place the schedule has always been decided, so no timer and no second code path can disagree with it. No new query per scheduler round. Judgement costs no extra request. `Poller.checkOne` already compares what the Site publishes against what is stored: a lower number contradicts the Sighting (Reader and both numbers logged), the same number confirms it, a higher number is the Site publishing and clears the attribution instead. Three contradictions stop that Reader deferring — their reports still write the Latest Chapter — and twenty consecutive confirmations forgive them, as does the owner's clear-marks control from #102. One client change was required: both userscripts skipped the PUT when the number had not moved, so the case the whole mechanism exists for — visiting a Series with nothing new — never reached the backend. `reportLatestChapter` sends it, skipping only the local write and the re-render. A numberless PUT (favourite toggle, progress from a chapter page) is no Sighting and defers nothing. Schema: migration `0011_series_sightings.sql` adds `series.latest_sighted_at` and `series.latest_raised_by`. Trust model, thresholds, and rejected alternatives with their citations: `docs/adr/0011-sighting-deferral-trust-model.md`. Reviewed on both axes (spec against #103, standards against the repo's rules); the blocker — attribution surviving a Poll that overtook the report — is fixed and has a test that fails without the fix. Verification: `go test ./...` green (needs Docker), `node --test userscript/test/*.test.js` 66 pass. Reviewed-on: #108 Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> |
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7c7d597019 |
Delete the kagane-specific cover path (#63) (#73)
Closes #63 Deletes the second way to reach a Cover. Since #62, every Site's cover bytes land in the content-addressed store at creation or on the poll, and the one public route serves them all — nothing needs the kagane proxy anymore. ## What went - **Template-level rewrite:** `Bookmark.CoverURL()` and both templates' use of it. Cards and chrome now render `.Cover` — the wire value — and nothing else. `Bookmark.CoverSource` was dead once `CoverURL` went, so it and its `bookmarkColumns` entry are gone too. - **Kagane-only cover route and its identifier validation:** `GET /img/kagane/{id}`, `web.CoverFetcher`, `coverIDRe`, and the whole `internal/web/cover.go`. - **The proxy's persistence:** `store.KaganeImageID`, `GetKaganeCover`, `PutKaganeCover`, `kaganeCoverSourceURL`, `kaganeCoverRe`. - **The kagane-shaped branch in the byte-fetch routing:** `fetchCoverBytes` no longer takes a `site` argument and no longer names a Site. The URL shape kagane's API publishes is claimed by the browser module itself — `kaganeImageURLRe` + `browserCoverURL` live in `latest/browser.go` with the rest of the per-Site knowledge — and `BrowserFetcher.Image` is now URL-driven (it validates the URL it will navigate to, same SSRF discipline as before). The no-plain-TLS-fallback rule for a claimed URL is preserved: a claimed address with no browser is an error, never a challenge-page fetch. ## What stayed (deliberately) - `BrowserFetcher.Image` and the browser-backed acquisition path: kagane genuinely serves cover bytes behind the challenge + `cross-origin-resource-policy: same-origin`, so the sidecar remains the only fetcher for them — it just routes by URL claim now instead of by Site name. - `fetcherFor`'s per-Site page routing (kagane/novelfull page fetches) — that is the page path, not a cover path. ## Acceptance criteria - [x] Template-level kagane cover rewrite gone - [x] Kagane-only cover route and its identifier validation gone - [x] Tests removed/rewritten against the general route, guarantees kept: unstored + traversal-shaped addresses serve nothing (`TestPublicCoverRejectsUnknownAddress`), non-image content types never echoed (`TestPublicCoverNeverEchoesNonImage` — new; the store-side gate was already pinned by `TestCoverStoreAcceptsAnySourceURL`). Store reopen-persistence and filesystem content-addressing tests rewritten against `PutCover`/`GetCover`, no guarantee lost. - [x] No Site name in a cover code path outside the acquisition module (`grep kagane backend`: store/web/templates/api are clean; remaining hits are `latest/browser.go` + `latest/sites.go`, tests, docs) - [x] Web UI and panel render Covers for all six Sites (templates render the wire address; panel renders `b.cover` — untouched, it never had a kagane path) - [x] `go test ./...` green ## Verification - `go vet ./...` clean - `go test ./...` — all packages pass (root 16.9s, latest 12.7s, store 12.7s, web 0.004s) - `CGO_ENABLED=0 go build` produces the static binary - Cover-path tests run verbosely: `TestPublicCoverServesStoredBytesUnauthenticated`, `TestPublicCoverRejectsUnknownAddress` (unknown/malformed/traversal/empty), `TestPublicCoverNeverEchoesNonImage`, `TestListRendersAcquiredCover`, `TestAcquireKaganeCoverThroughBrowser`, `TestRunOncePrefetchesKaganeCover`, `TestRunOnceRoutesNonKaganeCoverToPublicFetcher` all pass; the three `SMOKE_*` tests skip without the browser sidecar, as designed Live browser verification of the "web UI and panel render Covers for all six Sites" criterion is being run separately with Playwright against real Site pages and a locally mocked backend. Reviewed-on: #73 Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> |
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e2c054e7ce |
Covers render in the userscript panel, from a public route (#60) (#69)
Closes #60. Spec: #55. Originating bug: #47. Architecture: `docs/adr/0007-backend-hosts-cover-bytes.md`. Neither #47 nor #55 is closed from here. ## What this branch does The panel now renders Covers from the deployment's own origin, and both userscripts stop having an opinion about where a Cover lives. **The public route was already in place.** `GET /covers/{address}` landed with #59 (`92eba07`) and is registered on the bare mux, outside `httpmw.Auth` and outside the web UI's Discord session — `backend/main.go:210-214`, handler `backend/internal/api/handlers.go:142-158`. It reads no cookie and no header, answers `404` for an address that was never stored (and for a row whose file has gone missing — recorded-but-gone is not-found, never a fabricated body), refuses anything that is not `^[0-9a-f]{64}$` *before* the value becomes a path, and sets `Cache-Control: public, max-age=604800, immutable`. Those four properties are asserted by `backend/cover_test.go:231-278`. This branch re-verified them rather than re-implementing them; the only backend line it touches is a comment. **Both userscripts lose cover scraping entirely.** Every adapter's `cover:` field is gone, along with the two helpers that fed them: the manga script's `coverFromPage()` (the `img[alt]` DOM scan comix needed, because comix publishes no `og:image`) and the novel script's `metaName()` plus the now-callerless module-level `meta()`. Nothing under `userscript/` reads `og:image`, `meta[name=image]`, or `img[alt]` any more. **Nothing sends a cover either.** `delete body.cover` sits in `apiPut` — `manga-bookmark.user.js:486`, `novel-bookmark.user.js:275` — which is the single chokepoint every write passes through (`pushBookmark`, the retry-queue flush, `toggleFavorite`, `toggleArchive`). It operates on the `Object.assign` copy, so the in-memory row keeps the cover it renders with. This matters beyond tidiness: a Reader upgrading from an older copy has `localStorage` rows carrying third-party scraped URLs, and without the strip those would ride back up on the next write. The handler discards the field regardless (`handlers.go:53-59`) — it is permanently inert, not pending removal. **Failed loads get the designed empty state, not the broken-image glyph.** `onerror: (e) => e.target.replaceWith(el("div", { class: "cover ph" }))` on the cover `<img>` in both card renderers (`manga:1380-1390`, `novel:1134-1144`). The replacement is byte-identical to the existing no-cover branch on the very next line, so it picks up the `.cover.ph` styling already in the panel CSS — no new tokens, no new rule. `el()` routes any `on*` prop through `addEventListener`, so this is a listener, not an inline attribute string, and the swap is a `createElement` + DOM call with no markup parsing anywhere near it. This is the half of #47 that was visible on kagane. **The deleted scraping's tests went with it**: the two comix cover cases, the `pageImages` and `namedMetas` fixtures, the `img[alt]` and `meta[name=...]` stub branches, the now-dead `querySelectorAll` stub member, and every stale `og:image` fixture and `p.cover` assertion across both suites. The export lists needed no change and that was checked, not assumed — `coverFromPage` and `metaName` were module-private on `origin/main` and no cover symbol ever appeared in `module.exports`. Docs that described the deleted behaviour were corrected in the same breath, because leaving them would instruct the next agent to put the scraping back: `userscript/AGENTS.md` (adapter contract + the per-site notes for comix, kagane and novelfull), the README's adapter reference, and the userscript testing skill's stub table. ## Verification - `go test -count=1 ./...` — green across all nine packages (`backend` 29.8s, `latest`, `store`, `session`, `token`, `userscript`, `web`). - `node --check` clean on both userscripts; `node --test` on both logic suites — 46 tests, 46 pass. - `gofmt -l` clean; `go build ./...` clean. - The `onerror` swap is DOM behaviour and deliberately has no coverage in the Node harness — that harness stubs a browser precisely so it never needs a DOM, and #60 says not to invent coverage for it. It was instead exercised for real: the `el()` helper and the exact render expression were loaded into a headless Chromium with a deliberately unloadable `src`, and the resulting DOM was `<div class="cover ph"></div>`. Ad hoc, not committed. - **Not done, needs you:** the on-device criterion — a comix Series bookmarked mid-chapter showing its Cover in the panel. That needs a real install against the deployment and is the one box left unticked on #60. ## Reviewed Both `/code-review` axes ran against `cc0fa92`. Spec found no missed requirement and no scope creep; standards found the diff clean on the four areas it scrutinised (the `delete body.cover` placement, the `onerror` handler's DOM safety, comment quality, dead-code removal). Their combined findings — the dead `querySelectorAll` stub, the stale README and skill text, and the handler comment whose premise this change invalidates — are fixed in `8b58019`. ## Out of scope, deliberately The kagane-specific cover proxy still exists and still carries its session gate (#63 deletes it). The poll's blank-Cover fill (#61) and browser-backed Sites joining the pipeline (#62) are untouched. Reviewed-on: #69 Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> |
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92eba07da7 |
A newly bookmarked Series acquires its Cover at creation (#59) (#68)
Closes #59. Part of spec #55, and the ticket that fixes the reported bug #47. Architecture: `docs/adr/0007-backend-hosts-cover-bytes.md`. Does not close #47 or #55. ## What changed A Reader bookmarks a Series nobody holds yet — the exact case in #47 — and within seconds the list shows its artwork instead of a broken image. The first Bookmark to create a Series fires `Store.OnSeriesCreated` after commit, and the new `latest.Acquirer` turns that into **one** series-page fetch that yields both the Latest Chapter and the cover URL. The bytes go through the gated cover fetcher from #57 and are stored content-addressed through #56, so the wire carries an absolute URL on this deployment's own origin — never a third-party address, and never one that 404s. ### Store - Migration `0009_series_cover_address.sql` adds `series.cover_address`. The two facts are now split: `series.cover` is the third-party source address the bytes came from (the acquisition path's dedupe key), `series.cover_address` is the SHA-256 they are stored under. An empty `cover_address` is precisely what "no Cover yet" means, which is the distinction both the API and the UI depend on. - `SetSeriesCover` writes the address only after the bytes are on disk, so the wire can never name an object that is not there. - `CoverWireURL` builds `PUBLIC_BASE_URL + /covers/<sha256>` for every scanned row, and returns `""` for a blank address. - The cover columns are gone from `Upsert`'s `INSERT` and its `DO UPDATE`. A client-supplied cover cannot reach the shared Series row on any path, not just the creation path. - `Open` now rejects a base URL that is not an absolute `http(s)` origin: `PUBLIC_BASE_URL=bookmarks.example.com` would otherwise start cleanly and emit addresses no browser can load. ### Acquisition - `internal/latest/acquire.go`: one fetch, gated by the poller's own `fetchableSeriesURL` (a `series_url` arrives in a client-supplied PUT body, so without the gate a token-holder chooses what the server fetches from its own network position). - Asynchronous and log-and-drop. The Bookmark, its progress and its Latest Chapter are already committed; a Site that is down or a cover that cannot be produced disturbs none of them. - Bounded by a two-slot semaphore. A bulk sync creating N Series would otherwise fire N simultaneous requests from one IP — the traffic shape the poller's stagger exists to avoid. - Cancelled at shutdown (shares the poller's context) and stamps `latest_checked_at`, so the poller does not refetch the same page a tick later. - Browser-backed Sites (kagane, novelfull) are deliberately skipped: their pages only yield a Cloudflare challenge to the TLS client, so the request would be spent for nothing. They arrive in #62. ### Wire and route - `GET /covers/{address}` serves the bytes publicly and uncredentialed with `Cache-Control: public, max-age=604800, immutable`. The address is gated by a `^[0-9a-f]{64}$` pattern and cross-checked against a pure function of itself before any filesystem read, so no request shaped like a traversal reaches disk. - `PUT /bookmarks/{key}` still accepts a `cover` field and discards it, permanently. Rejecting it would break every installed userscript the moment this deploys, and ADR-0004's compatibility argument depends on those scripts continuing to work. The decode site says so in place of a TODO nobody intends to keep. - `store.CoverContentType` canonicalises comix's non-standard `image/jpg` to `image/jpeg`, so one image cannot land under two spellings. This one was found by the live smoke test, not by reading. ### Config `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` is new and required (cover URLs must go out absolute — the userscript renders them on third-party origins, where a relative path resolves against the Site). Documented in `.env.example`, `docker-compose.yml` (`:?` so compose fails too), `DEPLOY.md` and `backend/AGENTS.md`. ## Acceptance criteria All twelve of #59's criteria are met; the checklist on the issue is ticked with the evidence. ## Verification - `go test ./...` green (Docker-backed Postgres suite). - Live smoke against a real backend + Postgres: bookmarking `comix:n8we-dungeons-and-crayons` produced `"cover": "http://127.0.0.1:8099/covers/8ce74d80…"` and `"latest_chapter": "Chapter 81"` within seconds of the PUT; `curl` on that address returned `200`, `Content-Type: image/jpeg`, `Cache-Control: public, max-age=604800, immutable`, and a 280x420 JPEG. That run is what surfaced the `image/jpg` content type. - Mutation-checked the asynchrony test: removing the `go` from `Acquire` turns `TestAcquireDoesNotBlockTheWrite` red. ## Reviewed Both axes of `/code-review` were run against this diff before commit. Their findings that were actionable here are folded in: the concurrency bound, the shutdown tie, the `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` validation, the missing `latest_checked_at` stamp, and a test that could not fail. ## Known sequencing A kagane/novelfull Series created between this deploy and #62 has no cover source at all: the acquisition skips those Sites and `Upsert` no longer persists the userscript-scraped address. This is #59's stated boundary rather than a defect, but it is a user-visible gap on two Sites and should order #62 accordingly. Reviewed-on: #68 Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> |
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27cf0955de |
Per-Reader userscript credential with UI install and rotation (#24) (#32)
Closes #24. Child of #18; based on current main (includes Postgres, Reader table, Discord OAuth).
## What
Each Reader's userscript credential is derived from `TOKEN_KEY`, their Discord id and a token epoch (HMAC-SHA256, hex); only its SHA-256 sits in `readers.token_sha256` (new `token_epoch` column, migration 0006). One credential authenticates the script download path and the API bearer header.
- `internal/token`: derivation + hashing; the seed refreshes the owner's epoch-0 hash only before first rotation, so a restart can never resurrect a rotated-away credential
- `httpmw.Auth`/`ResolveReader`: acting Reader resolved from the credential hash, stashed in request context; the retired global `API_TOKEN` resolves to the owner until `API_TOKEN_GRACE_UNTIL` (enforced in code, logged per use) on both the bearer and script-download paths
- Userscript handler renders the bindmounted file with the resolved Reader's credential substituted for `__API_TOKEN__`; a legacy-path request during grace serves the derived credential, so installed devices self-migrate on their next update poll
- Web UI: "Userscripts" panel — session-gated install endpoints render the script directly (credential never in markup, address bar, or a redirect), confirm-gated rotation with an atomic epoch bump + hash rewrite and a reinstall warning
- Both userscripts carry `__API_TOKEN__` placeholders; the committed global-token literal is removed
## Design note
Credentials are derived rather than stored-random because the server must rebuild install URLs after restarts while the DB holds only hashes. HMAC output is high-entropy and unbrute-forceable; the AC's intent (unguessable, DB-leak-proof) is met.
## Deploy (also in DEPLOY.md)
1. Add `TOKEN_KEY` (`openssl rand -hex 32`) — required; changing it later invalidates every credential.
2. Keep `API_TOKEN` + set `API_TOKEN_GRACE_UNTIL` for the 14-day window.
3. After deploy, sign in → Userscripts → reinstall both scripts on every device. This also retires the old global credential for real — its literal survives in git history (present since
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8cebb94b92 |
Give every Bookmark an owner (Reader table) (#30)
Closes #22 ## What A `readers` table appears; every Bookmark belongs to one. The owner is seeded as the first and only Reader, and all existing rows are attached to them. - **Migration 0003**: `readers` (discord_id UNIQUE, token_sha256 UNIQUE, created_at). - **Migration 0004** (run-once, version-table-gated): attaches existing bookmarks to the seeded owner, drops the surrogate `key` column, composite PK `(reader_id, site, series_id)`, FK to readers `ON DELETE CASCADE` — a duplicate Bookmark for one Reader and Series is impossible at the database level. - **Seed**: `Store.Open` runs schema to 0003, seeds exactly one owner row from `OWNER_DISCORD_ID` (hash = SHA-256 of `API_TOKEN`, refreshed on every start so rotation stays current), then migrates the rest. - **Scoping**: `List/Get/Upsert/Delete` take `readerID`; the wire `key` is derived as `site:series_id` on read. Handlers act as `Store.OwnerID()` while the global token remains the only credential. - **Unchanged**: authentication and the flat wire format — nothing observable changes from outside. - **New env** `OWNER_DISCORD_ID` (required): compose, .env.example, DEPLOY.md, README.md, backend/AGENTS.md updated. Series-level methods (due queue, mark-checked, set-latest-chapter) stay unscoped deliberately: series are shared rows polled once per due cycle, and the reader_count ordering requires cross-reader visibility (ADR-0003). ## Verification - `go test ./...` green, including new tests: seed idempotency + hash refresh, 0004 attach migration, DB-level duplicate impossibility, per-reader scoping, reader-delete cascade. - Live smoke test on fresh Postgres: seed → PUT/GET (flat wire intact) → restart idempotent; stored hash matches SHA-256 of the token. ## Deploy note `OWNER_DISCORD_ID` is required after this lands — the backend refuses to start without it. Set it to the owner's Discord snowflake (Settings → Advanced → Developer Mode → right-click name → Copy User ID). Reviewed-on: #30 Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> |
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4229c179b0 |
rebrand: MangaBM → BookmarkManager, add novel library support (#15)
Two intertwined changes — the rebrand and the novel library were developed on
the same branch because the novel UI plumbing is part of the new "Bookmark
Manager" wordmark in the web shell.
## What it does
- **Rebrand**: MangaBM → BookmarkManager across the Go module, compose stack,
env vars, Traefik hostnames, container/image names, userscript storage
prefixes (`mangabm:cache` → `bmgr:manga:cache`, `mangabm:queue` → `bmgr:manga:queue`),
and docs.
- **Novel library**: same backend, two libraries. New `kind` column splits
bookmarks into `manga` / `novel`; PUT validates it. Two userscripts:
- `manga-bookmark.user.js` — unchanged behaviour, just stamps its own `kind`.
- `novel-bookmark.user.js` — separate Violentmonkey install with adapters
for **novelfull.com** (polled via headless browser — Cloudflare JS
challenge) and **lightnovelworld.net** (polled via plain TLS).
- **Web UI**: library switch on the app shell. Login art, libswitch, and
novel-site colours from the Cinder design snapshot.
## Plumbing
- `addedColumns` ALTER for `kind` runs on first start after upgrade; every
pre-existing row is backfilled to `'manga'`. No manual SQL, no down-time.
- `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` gains the two novel sites.
- New `NOVEL_USERSCRIPT_PATH` env (default `/userscript/novel-bookmark.user.js`),
bindmounted alongside the manga script.
- Traefik router names `mangabm*` → `bmapi*` / `bmweb*`.
## Test status
- `go test ./...` — green
- `node --test userscript/test/logic.test.js` — 34 pass
- `node --test userscript/test/novel-logic.test.js` — 11 pass
- `node --check` on both userscripts — clean
## Notes for the redeploy
.env keys were renamed (`MANGA_API_HOST` → `BOOKMARK_API_HOST`,
`MANGA_WEB_HOST` → `BOOKMARK_WEB_HOST`). Update DNS / Traefik labels on the
prod override before pulling, otherwise the public hostnames go dark.
See the redeploy instructions I'll post next to this PR.
Reviewed-on: #15
Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
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180ee78b1f |
Add comix.to and kagane.to support (#13)
Tracks read progress on comix.to and kagane.to alongside asura and demonic, in both the userscript and the backend. Implements `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-08-03-comix-kagane-support.md`. ## Userscript - `comix` adapter — `/title/<id>-<slug>`; only the id prefix is identity (the slug follows the title). No `og:image`, so the cover is matched by `alt`. - `kagane` adapter — reader URLs are uuids with no chapter number, so it comes out of `og:title`; anchor scanning is structurally impossible, replaced by `latestChapterFromApi` against kagane's same-origin JSON API. - `seriesId` threaded through `latestChapterFromAnchors` so comix can scope its scan to its own series and a recommendation strip cannot win the maximum. - `@match` for both hosts, panel chips, v1.6.0. ## Backend - `latestChapterFrom` cases: comix parses the SSR JSON state blob (`latestChapterUrl`, scoped to the series id); kagane parses API JSON (`chapter_no`). - Poller allowlist extended; `Poller.BrowserFetch` with `fetcherFor(site)` routes kagane to a browser fetcher. Nil means kagane is not polled at all — never a fallback to the TLS fetcher, which would only ever retrieve a challenge page. - `BrowserFetcher`: chromedp against a `headless-shell` sidecar. kagane sits behind a Cloudflare JS challenge that no TLS fingerprint clears, and the request is made inside the page rather than by replaying `cf_clearance`. - `BROWSER_WS_URL` wiring, sidecar in both compose files (no `ports:`, dedicated non-external network), Dockerfile on `golang:1.26-alpine` — chromedp requires go 1.26. - Web UI `--comix` / `--kagane` tokens in both colour branches. ## Notes for review - `series_url` is client-supplied and a headless browser is a strong SSRF primitive, so kagane's host is pinned twice: in `fetchableSeriesURL` and again in `kaganeAPIURL`. - Three chained defects found during verification made the browser path dead under Compose (sidecar flag collision, Chrome's Host-header DNS-rebinding check, the wrong chromedp option). Fixed; the compose comments record the wrong configurations too, so they don't get "simplified" back. - `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` now includes both new origins. Without it every write from comix/kagane silently fails CORS preflight, parks in the retry queue, and drops at the cap. ## Verification 221 backend tests, 32 userscript tests, static `CGO_ENABLED=0` build, both compose configs. Two gaps, both real: 1. The userscript on live pages via Violentmonkey needs a human browser profile — not run. Check: comix series page (title/cover, no chapter), comix chapter page (records the number; an *older* chapter must not regress it), comix SPA navigation without reload, kagane series page (og:image cover), kagane reader (number from `og:title`), both chips opening the right sites. 2. The kagane browser path has not completed end-to-end anywhere. Dial/navigate/fetch is confirmed, but Cloudflare 403'd headless-shell's Chrome on every attempt from the dev sandbox, and comix's poll-through-Docker was blocked by that environment's TLS interception. Both environment-dependent rather than branch defects — the first real deploy is the actual verification. Reviewed-on: #13 Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> |