083001672920c3d6efb00a0b6108ad085543fe91
8 Commits
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0830016729 |
feat(web): offer the userscripts as a download for mobile
Violentmonkey on mobile Chromium does not intercept navigation to a .user.js URL, so the Install link renders the script as text and there is no way to get it installed. Adding ?download=1 sets Content-Disposition: attachment on the same session-gated endpoint, so the Reader saves the file and adds it from Violentmonkey's own menu. The plain link stays inline on purpose: the updater polls the /u/ path and an attachment disposition there would break auto-update. The test asserts both halves. Refs #26 |
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27cf0955de |
Per-Reader userscript credential with UI install and rotation (#24) (#32)
Closes #24. Child of #18; based on current main (includes Postgres, Reader table, Discord OAuth).
## What
Each Reader's userscript credential is derived from `TOKEN_KEY`, their Discord id and a token epoch (HMAC-SHA256, hex); only its SHA-256 sits in `readers.token_sha256` (new `token_epoch` column, migration 0006). One credential authenticates the script download path and the API bearer header.
- `internal/token`: derivation + hashing; the seed refreshes the owner's epoch-0 hash only before first rotation, so a restart can never resurrect a rotated-away credential
- `httpmw.Auth`/`ResolveReader`: acting Reader resolved from the credential hash, stashed in request context; the retired global `API_TOKEN` resolves to the owner until `API_TOKEN_GRACE_UNTIL` (enforced in code, logged per use) on both the bearer and script-download paths
- Userscript handler renders the bindmounted file with the resolved Reader's credential substituted for `__API_TOKEN__`; a legacy-path request during grace serves the derived credential, so installed devices self-migrate on their next update poll
- Web UI: "Userscripts" panel — session-gated install endpoints render the script directly (credential never in markup, address bar, or a redirect), confirm-gated rotation with an atomic epoch bump + hash rewrite and a reinstall warning
- Both userscripts carry `__API_TOKEN__` placeholders; the committed global-token literal is removed
## Design note
Credentials are derived rather than stored-random because the server must rebuild install URLs after restarts while the DB holds only hashes. HMAC output is high-entropy and unbrute-forceable; the AC's intent (unguessable, DB-leak-proof) is met.
## Deploy (also in DEPLOY.md)
1. Add `TOKEN_KEY` (`openssl rand -hex 32`) — required; changing it later invalidates every credential.
2. Keep `API_TOKEN` + set `API_TOKEN_GRACE_UNTIL` for the 14-day window.
3. After deploy, sign in → Userscripts → reinstall both scripts on every device. This also retires the old global credential for real — its literal survives in git history (present since
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bcc6b45515 |
feat(backend): Discord OAuth login with DB-backed sessions (#23) (#31)
Implements #23 per ADR-0002. - Discord authorization code grant (identify + guilds.members.read), form-encoded token exchange - Guild membership gate via the single-guild endpoint; optional DISCORD_REQUIRED_ROLE (empty default) - Owner Discord ID is the only identity allowed to sign in - Sessions are DB rows with opaque random ids; cookie carries only the id; expiry enforced; delete = revoke - HMAC session signing, derived key, and WEB_PASSWORD removed; no replacement signing secret - Login rate limiting preserved on the callback - Full flow tested through the real router against a local Discord stub (DISCORD_API_BASE) - Env: DISCORD_CLIENT_ID/_CLIENT_SECRET/_GUILD_ID/_REQUIRED_ROLE/_API_BASE/_REDIRECT_URI; docs updated go test ./... passes. Reviewed-on: #31 Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> |
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8cebb94b92 |
Give every Bookmark an owner (Reader table) (#30)
Closes #22 ## What A `readers` table appears; every Bookmark belongs to one. The owner is seeded as the first and only Reader, and all existing rows are attached to them. - **Migration 0003**: `readers` (discord_id UNIQUE, token_sha256 UNIQUE, created_at). - **Migration 0004** (run-once, version-table-gated): attaches existing bookmarks to the seeded owner, drops the surrogate `key` column, composite PK `(reader_id, site, series_id)`, FK to readers `ON DELETE CASCADE` — a duplicate Bookmark for one Reader and Series is impossible at the database level. - **Seed**: `Store.Open` runs schema to 0003, seeds exactly one owner row from `OWNER_DISCORD_ID` (hash = SHA-256 of `API_TOKEN`, refreshed on every start so rotation stays current), then migrates the rest. - **Scoping**: `List/Get/Upsert/Delete` take `readerID`; the wire `key` is derived as `site:series_id` on read. Handlers act as `Store.OwnerID()` while the global token remains the only credential. - **Unchanged**: authentication and the flat wire format — nothing observable changes from outside. - **New env** `OWNER_DISCORD_ID` (required): compose, .env.example, DEPLOY.md, README.md, backend/AGENTS.md updated. Series-level methods (due queue, mark-checked, set-latest-chapter) stay unscoped deliberately: series are shared rows polled once per due cycle, and the reader_count ordering requires cross-reader visibility (ADR-0003). ## Verification - `go test ./...` green, including new tests: seed idempotency + hash refresh, 0004 attach migration, DB-level duplicate impossibility, per-reader scoping, reader-delete cascade. - Live smoke test on fresh Postgres: seed → PUT/GET (flat wire intact) → restart idempotent; stored hash matches SHA-256 of the token. ## Deploy note `OWNER_DISCORD_ID` is required after this lands — the backend refuses to start without it. Set it to the owner's Discord snowflake (Settings → Advanced → Developer Mode → right-click name → Copy User ID). Reviewed-on: #30 Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> |
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984965ed9f |
Split Series from Bookmark, keeping the wire format flat (#21) (#29)
Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> |
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08749df050 |
feat(backend)!: run on Postgres with a migration-owned schema (#28)
Swap modernc.org/sqlite for jackc/pgx/v5 with no observable change: same endpoints, same wire format, same updated_at ordering rule. The schema now comes from numbered SQL embedded in the binary and applied on startup, one transaction each, recorded in schema_migrations. That replaces two pieces of SQLite-era machinery, both deleted rather than ported: the column probing (Postgres has ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS, and there is no legacy database left to probe) and the Asura key rewrite, which has run clean on every start for months now that the userscripts strip build hashes before writing. Its regexp survives as latest.asuraBuildHash, where the poller still needs it to scope chapter links to a series whose slug carries a rotating hash. Types get real: favorite is a boolean, chapter numbers double precision, timestamps stay unix-ms bigint. SQLite's null-safe IS NOT becomes IS DISTINCT FROM, which is what implements the rule that only reading progress reorders a list. Inside COALESCE/NULLIF the status and kind parameters need an explicit ::text -- there is no target column to infer from and Postgres refuses to guess. Tests lose their free t.TempDir() database, so Docker is now a hard prerequisite for `go test ./...`: internal/pgtest starts one postgres:17-alpine per test binary and hands each test a database of its own. Also lands CONTEXT.md and the four ADRs written while scoping #18. BREAKING CHANGE: DB_PATH is retired for DATABASE_URL, which is required and has no default. Compose gains a postgres service on an internal network with its own volume; POSTGRES_PASSWORD joins .env. The old bookmarks-data volume is deliberately left undeclared so `docker compose down -v` cannot take the pre-migration database with it. main is not deployable until #25 and #26 land. Closes #20 Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com> |
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b9f9aea82c |
docs: secure-coding rules for agents, and refresh stale AGENTS.md top-matter (#16)
Two doc commits: a new secure-coding rules section, plus a fix for top-matter the rebrand left stale.
## `9156525` — secure-coding rules
`AGENTS.md` carried two security invariants (bearer auth, CORS) but nothing about the code an agent actually writes here. That is the gap worth closing: measured rates for AI-generated web/backend code are ~40% vulnerable (Pearce et al.), 45% failing security tests (Veracode 2025), and users *with* assistants shipped SQLi at 36% vs 7% for the control group (Perry et al., Stanford). The failure classes cluster on broken access control, injection, session/error handling and invented dependencies — all live surfaces in this repo.
Rules were **extracted, not pasted**. Every one names a guard that already exists in-tree, so the instruction is *match this*, not *invent something*:
| Rule | Existing anchor |
| --- | --- |
| parameterized SQL only; constants may concatenate | `store.go` — all queries use `?` |
| `html/template` only; no `template.HTML` on stored data | `web.go:85` |
| client-supplied URLs pass the fetch gate | `poller.go:144 fetchableSeriesURL` |
| cap remote bodies | `fetch.go:16 maxBodyBytes` |
| `subtle.ConstantTimeCompare`, never `==` | `middleware.go:22`, `session.go:61` |
| generic error out, detail to log, never log the token | `web.go:151` |
| `X-Forwarded-Proto` for Secure; **rightmost** XFF for IP | `session.go:68,101` |
| cookie flags; expiry checked before signature | `session.go:72-94`, `Verify` |
| validate at handler boundary | `handlers.go:48` `MaxBytesReader` 64 KB, 400 on bad key/status/kind |
| site strings via `el({text})`, never `{html}` | `el()` in both userscripts |
| `fetch()`/`authHeaders()` → `API_BASE` only | existing `authHeaders` |
| `localStorage` = cache/queue, never credentials | shared with site JS |
Plus a dependency rule (stdlib first; verify a package exists before adding — ~20% of LLM-proposed packages don't resolve, which is the slopsquatting vector) and a review gate marking auth/CORS/session/crypto/fetch-gate as security-critical.
Deliberately **excluded**: container signing, k8s admission control, IaC scanning, PII/HIPAA/PCI, C/C++ memory safety. Per OpenSSF's guide for AI assistant instructions, irrelevant rules make a model generate code compensating for attacks that cannot happen. None of those apply to a single-user Go + SQLite + userscript stack.
Sources: OWASP AISVS 1.0 Appendix C, OWASP Top 10 / ASVS v5, OpenSSF *Security-Focused Guide for AI Code Assistant Instructions* (2025-08-01).
## `5d4d890` — stale top-matter
The rebrand rewrote root `AGENTS.md` as a compression pass and switched Bromite -> Violentmonkey, but left the project described as a manga-only tracker over two sites. Six sites, two libraries and two userscripts now exist.
Root `AGENTS.md`:
- *What this is* names both scripts with their site lists, the `kind` column, and the `<site>:<series_id>` key shape.
- Origins constraint generalised past Asura/Demonic.
- Records that **kagane and novelfull are reliably Cloudflare-challenged** and browser-polled over CDP. Without it that bullet list reads as contradicting the code, since the paragraph above asserts blocking is "not universal — and not reliably reproducible".
- Diagram says two userscripts.
`backend/AGENTS.md` — two instances of the same defect, found while verifying the above:
- Store key list gained `novelfull|lightnovelworld` and the `kind` column.
- **`NOVEL_USERSCRIPT_PATH` documented** — it shipped in `main.go:150` undocumented.
The dated Cloudflare paragraph is left verbatim: it is a timestamped observation ("Verified 2026-07-26"), so rewriting it would falsify a record rather than update it. `userscript/AGENTS.md` is untouched; it already documents both novel adapters and the `LIBRARY`/`STORE_PREFIX` split.
## Verification
Docs-only, no code touched. Every code reference above was read at `4229c17` before being cited — the fetch gate, body cap, constant-time compares, cookie flags, handler validation, `el()` helper and both route registrations. No invented line numbers.
## Not addressed here
The `API_TOKEN` literal is committed in plaintext in both userscripts and in their `@downloadURL`/`@updateURL` lines. The new rules say not to propagate it, but the actual remedy is rotation plus build-time substitution, since the value is already in git history. Separate change; flagging it so it does not get lost.
Reviewed-on: #16
Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
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4229c179b0 |
rebrand: MangaBM → BookmarkManager, add novel library support (#15)
Two intertwined changes — the rebrand and the novel library were developed on
the same branch because the novel UI plumbing is part of the new "Bookmark
Manager" wordmark in the web shell.
## What it does
- **Rebrand**: MangaBM → BookmarkManager across the Go module, compose stack,
env vars, Traefik hostnames, container/image names, userscript storage
prefixes (`mangabm:cache` → `bmgr:manga:cache`, `mangabm:queue` → `bmgr:manga:queue`),
and docs.
- **Novel library**: same backend, two libraries. New `kind` column splits
bookmarks into `manga` / `novel`; PUT validates it. Two userscripts:
- `manga-bookmark.user.js` — unchanged behaviour, just stamps its own `kind`.
- `novel-bookmark.user.js` — separate Violentmonkey install with adapters
for **novelfull.com** (polled via headless browser — Cloudflare JS
challenge) and **lightnovelworld.net** (polled via plain TLS).
- **Web UI**: library switch on the app shell. Login art, libswitch, and
novel-site colours from the Cinder design snapshot.
## Plumbing
- `addedColumns` ALTER for `kind` runs on first start after upgrade; every
pre-existing row is backfilled to `'manga'`. No manual SQL, no down-time.
- `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` gains the two novel sites.
- New `NOVEL_USERSCRIPT_PATH` env (default `/userscript/novel-bookmark.user.js`),
bindmounted alongside the manga script.
- Traefik router names `mangabm*` → `bmapi*` / `bmweb*`.
## Test status
- `go test ./...` — green
- `node --test userscript/test/logic.test.js` — 34 pass
- `node --test userscript/test/novel-logic.test.js` — 11 pass
- `node --check` on both userscripts — clean
## Notes for the redeploy
.env keys were renamed (`MANGA_API_HOST` → `BOOKMARK_API_HOST`,
`MANGA_WEB_HOST` → `BOOKMARK_WEB_HOST`). Update DNS / Traefik labels on the
prod override before pulling, otherwise the public hostnames go dark.
See the redeploy instructions I'll post next to this PR.
Reviewed-on: #15
Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
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