2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
sulthan 27cf0955de Per-Reader userscript credential with UI install and rotation (#24) (#32)
Closes #24. Child of #18; based on current main (includes Postgres, Reader table, Discord OAuth).

## What

Each Reader's userscript credential is derived from `TOKEN_KEY`, their Discord id and a token epoch (HMAC-SHA256, hex); only its SHA-256 sits in `readers.token_sha256` (new `token_epoch` column, migration 0006). One credential authenticates the script download path and the API bearer header.

- `internal/token`: derivation + hashing; the seed refreshes the owner's epoch-0 hash only before first rotation, so a restart can never resurrect a rotated-away credential
- `httpmw.Auth`/`ResolveReader`: acting Reader resolved from the credential hash, stashed in request context; the retired global `API_TOKEN` resolves to the owner until `API_TOKEN_GRACE_UNTIL` (enforced in code, logged per use) on both the bearer and script-download paths
- Userscript handler renders the bindmounted file with the resolved Reader's credential substituted for `__API_TOKEN__`; a legacy-path request during grace serves the derived credential, so installed devices self-migrate on their next update poll
- Web UI: "Userscripts" panel — session-gated install endpoints render the script directly (credential never in markup, address bar, or a redirect), confirm-gated rotation with an atomic epoch bump + hash rewrite and a reinstall warning
- Both userscripts carry `__API_TOKEN__` placeholders; the committed global-token literal is removed

## Design note

Credentials are derived rather than stored-random because the server must rebuild install URLs after restarts while the DB holds only hashes. HMAC output is high-entropy and unbrute-forceable; the AC's intent (unguessable, DB-leak-proof) is met.

## Deploy (also in DEPLOY.md)

1. Add `TOKEN_KEY` (`openssl rand -hex 32`) — required; changing it later invalidates every credential.
2. Keep `API_TOKEN` + set `API_TOKEN_GRACE_UNTIL` for the 14-day window.
3. After deploy, sign in → Userscripts → reinstall both scripts on every device. This also retires the old global credential for real — its literal survives in git history (present since 0ef5286), so rotation is what kills it.

## Verification

- Full Go suite green against real Postgres per test; userscript JS suite 45/45
- New router-level tests: per-Reader isolation (read/write/delete), grace expiry on bearer + script path, self-migrating legacy path, install serving, rotation (old cred 401/404, new cred works, install renders new credential), app page leaks no credential
- Store tests: hash lookup, token info, atomic rotation with stale-epoch rejection, rotation survives restart
- Live smoke of the built binary: grace acceptance logged, derived auth, substitution, restart resilience, stored hash = SHA-256 of derived credential

Reviewed-on: #32
Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 14:54:03 +07:00
sulthan 180ee78b1f Add comix.to and kagane.to support (#13)
Tracks read progress on comix.to and kagane.to alongside asura and demonic, in both the userscript and the backend.

Implements `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-08-03-comix-kagane-support.md`.

## Userscript

- `comix` adapter — `/title/<id>-<slug>`; only the id prefix is identity (the slug follows the title). No `og:image`, so the cover is matched by `alt`.
- `kagane` adapter — reader URLs are uuids with no chapter number, so it comes out of `og:title`; anchor scanning is structurally impossible, replaced by `latestChapterFromApi` against kagane's same-origin JSON API.
- `seriesId` threaded through `latestChapterFromAnchors` so comix can scope its scan to its own series and a recommendation strip cannot win the maximum.
- `@match` for both hosts, panel chips, v1.6.0.

## Backend

- `latestChapterFrom` cases: comix parses the SSR JSON state blob (`latestChapterUrl`, scoped to the series id); kagane parses API JSON (`chapter_no`).
- Poller allowlist extended; `Poller.BrowserFetch` with `fetcherFor(site)` routes kagane to a browser fetcher. Nil means kagane is not polled at all — never a fallback to the TLS fetcher, which would only ever retrieve a challenge page.
- `BrowserFetcher`: chromedp against a `headless-shell` sidecar. kagane sits behind a Cloudflare JS challenge that no TLS fingerprint clears, and the request is made inside the page rather than by replaying `cf_clearance`.
- `BROWSER_WS_URL` wiring, sidecar in both compose files (no `ports:`, dedicated non-external network), Dockerfile on `golang:1.26-alpine` — chromedp requires go 1.26.
- Web UI `--comix` / `--kagane` tokens in both colour branches.

## Notes for review

- `series_url` is client-supplied and a headless browser is a strong SSRF primitive, so kagane's host is pinned twice: in `fetchableSeriesURL` and again in `kaganeAPIURL`.
- Three chained defects found during verification made the browser path dead under Compose (sidecar flag collision, Chrome's Host-header DNS-rebinding check, the wrong chromedp option). Fixed; the compose comments record the wrong configurations too, so they don't get "simplified" back.
- `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` now includes both new origins. Without it every write from comix/kagane silently fails CORS preflight, parks in the retry queue, and drops at the cap.

## Verification

221 backend tests, 32 userscript tests, static `CGO_ENABLED=0` build, both compose configs.

Two gaps, both real:

1. The userscript on live pages via Violentmonkey needs a human browser profile — not run. Check: comix series page (title/cover, no chapter), comix chapter page (records the number; an *older* chapter must not regress it), comix SPA navigation without reload, kagane series page (og:image cover), kagane reader (number from `og:title`), both chips opening the right sites.
2. The kagane browser path has not completed end-to-end anywhere. Dial/navigate/fetch is confirmed, but Cloudflare 403'd headless-shell's Chrome on every attempt from the dev sandbox, and comix's poll-through-Docker was blocked by that environment's TLS interception. Both environment-dependent rather than branch defects — the first real deploy is the actual verification.

Reviewed-on: #13
Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
2026-08-03 19:53:45 +07:00