Per-Reader userscript credential with UI install and rotation (#24) (#32)

Closes #24. Child of #18; based on current main (includes Postgres, Reader table, Discord OAuth).

## What

Each Reader's userscript credential is derived from `TOKEN_KEY`, their Discord id and a token epoch (HMAC-SHA256, hex); only its SHA-256 sits in `readers.token_sha256` (new `token_epoch` column, migration 0006). One credential authenticates the script download path and the API bearer header.

- `internal/token`: derivation + hashing; the seed refreshes the owner's epoch-0 hash only before first rotation, so a restart can never resurrect a rotated-away credential
- `httpmw.Auth`/`ResolveReader`: acting Reader resolved from the credential hash, stashed in request context; the retired global `API_TOKEN` resolves to the owner until `API_TOKEN_GRACE_UNTIL` (enforced in code, logged per use) on both the bearer and script-download paths
- Userscript handler renders the bindmounted file with the resolved Reader's credential substituted for `__API_TOKEN__`; a legacy-path request during grace serves the derived credential, so installed devices self-migrate on their next update poll
- Web UI: "Userscripts" panel — session-gated install endpoints render the script directly (credential never in markup, address bar, or a redirect), confirm-gated rotation with an atomic epoch bump + hash rewrite and a reinstall warning
- Both userscripts carry `__API_TOKEN__` placeholders; the committed global-token literal is removed

## Design note

Credentials are derived rather than stored-random because the server must rebuild install URLs after restarts while the DB holds only hashes. HMAC output is high-entropy and unbrute-forceable; the AC's intent (unguessable, DB-leak-proof) is met.

## Deploy (also in DEPLOY.md)

1. Add `TOKEN_KEY` (`openssl rand -hex 32`) — required; changing it later invalidates every credential.
2. Keep `API_TOKEN` + set `API_TOKEN_GRACE_UNTIL` for the 14-day window.
3. After deploy, sign in → Userscripts → reinstall both scripts on every device. This also retires the old global credential for real — its literal survives in git history (present since 0ef5286), so rotation is what kills it.

## Verification

- Full Go suite green against real Postgres per test; userscript JS suite 45/45
- New router-level tests: per-Reader isolation (read/write/delete), grace expiry on bearer + script path, self-migrating legacy path, install serving, rotation (old cred 401/404, new cred works, install renders new credential), app page leaks no credential
- Store tests: hash lookup, token info, atomic rotation with stale-epoch rejection, rotation survives restart
- Live smoke of the built binary: grace acceptance logged, derived auth, substitution, restart resilience, stored hash = SHA-256 of derived credential

Reviewed-on: #32
Co-authored-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>
Co-committed-by: Sulthan Zaki <sultankiki05@gmail.com>

backend/AGENTS.md

@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ Guidance for OpenCode (and Claude Code) working under `backend/`. See root `AGEN
   container per test binary (`TestMain` -> `pgtest.Main`) and hands each test
   its own database (`pgtest.URL(t)`). A package whose tests touch the store
   must have that `TestMain`.
-- **Single-owner store, three tables.** `readers` is keyed by Discord user ID
-  and carries the SHA-256 of the owner's userscript token (the global
-  `API_TOKEN` today; issue #22). The seed creates exactly one row at startup.
+- **Single-owner store, four tables.** `readers` is keyed by Discord user ID
+  and carries the SHA-256 of the Reader's userscript credential plus a
+  `token_epoch` (issue #24). Credentials are derived, never stored: `token.Token(TOKEN_KEY, discord_id, epoch)` (HMAC, `internal/token`), and only its SHA-256 sits in `readers.token_sha256`, so install URLs can be rebuilt after any restart while a database leak yields nothing but hashes. The seed creates exactly one row at startup; its epoch-0 hash is refreshed on every start **only while the row has never been rotated**, so a restart can never resurrect a rotated-away credential. Rotation is `Store.RotateToken` (epoch bump + hash rewrite in one transaction), driven by the web UI.
   `series` keyed `(site, series_id)`
   (`asura`|`demonic`|`comix`|`kagane`|`novelfull`|`lightnovelworld`) owns the
   shared facts — title, cover, canonical URL, `kind` (`manga`|`novel`),
@@ -31,12 +31,14 @@ Guidance for OpenCode (and Claude Code) working under `backend/`. See root `AGEN
   differs between readers: progress, favourite, lifecycle bucket,
   `updated_at`. A bookmark is keyed `(reader_id, site, series_id)` — no
   surrogate id; the wire `key` is derived as `site:series_id` on read — and
-  every store read/write is scoped to the reader it names. `Store.OwnerID()`
-  is the seeded owner, which every handler passes while the global token is
-  still the only credential. Sync **last-write-wins**; the wire format stays
-  flat (ADR-0004). `Store.Upsert` decomposes one flat body across two tables
-  and enforces the ownership rule: client `title`/`series_url`/`cover` are
-  written only when the series row is new (ADR-0003).
+  every store read/write is scoped to the reader it names. Auth resolves the
+  acting Reader from the presented credential (`httpmw.Auth`), and the
+  reader id travels in the request context; the retired global `API_TOKEN`
+  additionally resolves to the owner until `API_TOKEN_GRACE_UNTIL`, with
+  every such acceptance logged. Sync **last-write-wins**; the wire format
+  stays flat (ADR-0004). `Store.Upsert` decomposes one flat body across two
+  tables and enforces the ownership rule: client `title`/`series_url`/`cover`
+  are written only when the series row is new (ADR-0003).
 - **Endpoints:** `GET /bookmarks`, `PUT /bookmarks/{key}` (upsert; see `updated_at` rule below), `DELETE /bookmarks/{key}`, `GET /healthz` (no auth).
 - **Web UI:** same binary serve the browser UI on a second
   hostname — `GET /` (list, or login page when no session),
@@ -101,7 +103,10 @@ Guidance for OpenCode (and Claude Code) working under `backend/`. See root `AGEN
   `excluded.*` is post-evaluation row and default applied there would
   wipe bucket on every PUT from client that predates column. See
   `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-27-status-buckets-design.md`.
-- **Config via env:** `API_TOKEN`, `OWNER_DISCORD_ID` (seeds the owner Reader;
+- **Config via env:** `TOKEN_KEY` (derives every Reader's userscript credential;
+  required), `API_TOKEN` + `API_TOKEN_GRACE_UNTIL` (retired global credential
+  and the moment it stops resolving to the owner — both removed after the
+  cutover window, enforced in code), `OWNER_DISCORD_ID` (seeds the owner Reader;
   required), `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` (comma list),
   `DATABASE_URL` (Postgres connection URL, required — no default),
   `PORT` (default `8080`), `DISCORD_CLIENT_ID`/`_CLIENT_SECRET`/`_GUILD_ID`/
@@ -113,7 +118,15 @@ Guidance for OpenCode (and Claude Code) working under `backend/`. See root `AGEN
   `USERSCRIPT_PATH` and `NOVEL_USERSCRIPT_PATH` (files served at
   `/u/{token}/manga-bookmark.user.js` and `/u/{token}/novel-bookmark.user.js`,
   defaults `/userscript/manga-bookmark.user.js` and
-  `/userscript/novel-bookmark.user.js`, both supplied by bindmount).
+  `/userscript/novel-bookmark.user.js`, both supplied by bindmount; the
+  `__API_TOKEN__` placeholder inside them is substituted with the requesting
+  Reader's credential at serve time).
   `BROWSER_WS_URL` (headless-shell CDP endpoint for kagane and novelfull;
   unset disables browser polling and leaves those sites to the userscript
   alone).
+- **Web UI also owns:** session-gated `GET /install/{manga,novel}-bookmark.user.js`
+  (renders the bindmounted script with the acting Reader's derived credential
+  substituted in — the credential never appears in page markup, the address
+  bar, or a redirect) and `POST /rotate-token` (atomic epoch bump + hash
+  rewrite; invalidates every installed copy, so the panel warns to reinstall
+  on all devices).